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Socrates Misinterpreted and Misapplied: An Analysis of the 
Constructed Contradiction between the Apology and the Crito
Masha Marchevsky
Introduction
Plato’s dialogues portray Socrates, the philosopher, through his conversations with others.  
The Apology, one of the first dialogues written by Plato, presents Socrates’ argument to the court 
as to why he is not guilty of breaking Athenian law under the accusation of corrupting the youth 
and worshiping gods different from the gods everyone else worships.  In his speech, Socrates 
shows that he has not corrupted the youth more than any other Athenian citizen has and that he is 
no atheist, but rather that he believes in gods and has even visited the Oracle.  Moreover, Socrates 
argues that if doing philosophy makes him guilty, then the court should either put him to death or 
acquit him because he will never stop searching for wisdom.  Socrates says, “Men of Athens, I 
have the highest regard and affection for you, but I will obey god rather than you…. Either acquit 
me, or don’t, knowing that I will not behave differently even if I am to be put to death a thousand 
times over (29d).”1 Scholars of the Apology, such as John T. Bookman, Reginald Allen, Anthony 
Woozley, and David Luban, frequently interpret Socrates’ statement to show him defiant of the 
court, saying that if the court ordered him to stop practicing philosophy, then he would disobey.
In contrast with the Apology, Plato’s Crito suggests Socrates held the philosophy that 
citizens of a state have a duty to obey laws.  Socrates provides several arguments for this.  First, 
Socrates makes an argument from agreement, which says that if people decide to live within a 
state they make an implicit agreement to follow the laws of that state.  With a genuine alternative,
if people do not agree the laws are fair, then they must leave the state.  If they do not leave, then 
an implicit agreement is formed and they must adhere (52b-53c).2  Secondly, Socrates argues that 
breaking the law would result in a destruction of the rule of law in Athens.  This is an argument 
from “non-injury.”  If everyone broke laws they believed to be unjust, then harm would result.  
Therefore, Socrates argued he could not break the law in order to avoid a complete destruction of 
Athenian law (50b). 3   The third argument Socrates makes demonstrates a duty to obey in 
reciprocity for benefits.  Socrates argues that because we have a duty to obey our parents and 
because the state is like a parent, we have a duty to obey the state.  If we participate under an 
enterprise under which we receive benefits, then fairness requires us to obey the rules of that 
enterprise (50e-51c).4  Clearly, in the Crito, Socrates’ agenda is to convince Crito that following 
the law is a duty that every moral citizen must follow.  Therefore, Socrates cannot escape from 
jail and avoid drinking deadly hemlock as a punishment from the court.
Scholars and philosophers frequently point out and try to resolve the contradiction 
between the Apology and the Crito.  Typically, they try to frame the dialogues to allow for civil 
disobedience.  As a result of the common interpretation that Socrates’ philosophy supports 
disobeying the law when it is immoral, in his letter from the Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther 
King alludes to Socrates as an explicit supporter of civil disobedience.  In his letter he wrote, “To 
a degree, academic freedom is a reality today because Socrates practiced civil disobedience.”5  In 
my paper, I will first outline the arguments in the Crito, which demonstrate Socrates’ 
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commitment to obedience of the law.  Second, I will discuss a common interpretation of the 
Apology’s stance on civil disobedience and demonstrate the contradiction.  Next, I will 
demonstrate that the solutions scholars offer to the contradiction do not solve it.  Finally, I will 
offer my explanation of how the Apology and the Crito work together to advance Socrates’ belief 
in obedience to Athenian Laws.  My argument will demonstrate that Martin Luther King’s 
interpretation of and allusion to Socrates is incorrect.
Socrates’ Arguments in the Crito
In the Crito, Socrates personifies the Laws of Athens to offer two major arguments for 
obedience of the laws from agreement and from non-injury.  The two arguments persuade 
Socrates’ friend Crito that despite Socrates’ belief that the verdict in his trial was unjust, Socrates 
must obey the court order.  Daniel Farrell offers a common scholarly interpretation of the 
arguments Socrates presents in the Crito and strengthens them.  I will use his presentation of the 
arguments as a springboard for closer analysis of how they present explanations for obedience to 
the state.
The argument from agreement is based on the claim that Socrates would be breaking his 
word if he tried to escape.  In the Crito, the Laws speak for Socrates to effectively persuade Crito 
of the reasons Socrates has to choose death over an escape from prison.  Asking Socrates about 
his agreement, the Laws demonstrate that he has agreed to obey them both verbally and through 
his actions.  “Are we right in saying that you have agreed—not just verbally, but by your 
behavior—to live your life as a citizen under us?” (52d).6  Daniel Farrell finishes the presentation 
of the argument by showing that by this, the Laws imply obedience is a result of Socrates’ choice, 
“to live in Athens, knowing what would be expected of him if he did.”7  From this, the Laws 
logically conclude that anyone who freely chooses to live in Athens and knows the consequences 
of that choice has entered into an agreement to do what the Laws command (52e).  From this, the 
logical conclusion is that Socrates cannot escape from jail, because the court’s decision was a 
lawful state order to death, and he agreed by staying in Athens that he would obey such orders.  
Often, scholars question whether Socrates has an agreement with the court or with the 
state as a whole.  One reading of the dialogue claims that Socrates has an agreement only with the 
Laws, not the court or the state.  This is evident because throughout the dialogue, the Laws are 
speaking to Crito through Socrates, and when an agreement is discussed, they refer to themselves, 
rather than a state or court.  The Laws function through the state and the court, however, and 
would not exist without them.  Rather than the state and court being entities in themselves that 
must be followed, they are tools of the Laws.  As long as the court and the state act in accordance 
with the Laws and to advance their purposes, then they must be followed as well.  Since obeying 
lawful court convictions is a part of Socrates’ agreement, this argument shows that Socrates must 
obey the law.
The second argument Socrates presents through the Laws for why he should accept his 
punishment is based on a concept Daniel Farrell presents as “non-injury.”  There are two parts to 
this argument.  The first is a demonstration that disobeying the Laws destroys the state, and the 
second is that the state has a parent-child relationship with each citizen, and harming parents is 
immoral.  The argument that disobeying the Laws destroys the state can be outlined as follows:
1. If everyone doing “x” would lead to a disaster, then no one should do “x.”
2. If everyone broke laws one believed to be unjust, then the rule of law would be 
destroyed.
6
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3. Socrates should not disobey the laws.
Socrates demonstrates earlier in the dialogue that doing harm in general is wrong.  Combining 
that argument with the above argument demonstrates that Socrates believes he cannot disobey the 
laws because it would destroy the rule of law, cause massive harm, and would therefore be 
immoral.
The Laws in the Crito describe the parent-child analogy.  Farrell offers an accurate 
summary of the analogy.  “According to the Laws, the state provides and cares for its citizens in 
much the same way a parent provides and cares for its children.  In fact, they say, the state does 
even more for the citizens than a parent does for a child...”8 From there, if we must concede that a 
child has an obligation to obey his or her parents, we conclude that, similarly, each citizen has a 
duty to obey the Laws, as they function through the state.  Therefore, it would be wrong for 
Socrates to escape.  Clearly, this argument is another demonstration that Socrates wants to argue 
that everyone must obey the Laws of Athens.
Although there are many responses as to why Socrates is wrong and why laws can and 
should be disobeyed, the purpose of the presentation of the arguments above was to show that 
Socrates does argue for obedience to the laws in the Crito.  By providing two detailed arguments, 
Socrates clearly demonstrates his belief, if we assume his sincerity in the Crito, that laws must be 
obeyed.
Socrates in the Apology
Common interpretations of the Apology present a clear contradiction between it and the 
Crito.  In the Apology, Socrates presents arguments in front of the court as to why the court 
should not convict him.  Socrates is on trial as a result of accusations brought about by Meletus.  
R.E. Allen, in his book Socrates and Legal Obligation, describes the accusations brought against 
Socrates.  “There were, then, three counts: refusing to acknowledge the gods acknowledged by 
the city, introducing new (or strange, kaina) divinities; and corrupting the youth.”9  Throughout 
his defense, it turns out that Socrates never answers these accusations, but only offers cross-
examination questions for his accuser.  Through cross-examination, Socrates proves that he 
corrupts the youth no more than any other Athenian citizen and demonstrates that he is not an 
atheist.
The apparent conflict with the Crito becomes relevant when Socrates discusses his 
disobedience of the Thirty Tyrants and when Socrates tells the court he would not obey their 
order if they asked him to stop practicing philosophy.  David Luban, in his article “Difference 
Made Legal, the Court and Dr. King,” summarizes the two arguments.
When the Thirty Tyrants had ordered him to arrest Leon the Salaminian unjustly, so as 
‘to implicate as many in their crimes as they could,’ Socrates merely went home; he tells 
his jurors that he would have died for his disobedience had the government not fallen 
soon after.  And earlier in his defense Socrates provokes his jurors by telling them that if 
they were to order him, on pain of death, to abandon his philosophical activities, he 
would reply: “Men of Athens, I respect and love you, and while I live and am able to 
continue, I shall never give up philosophy.10
Luban offers a common interpretation of the arguments Socrates presents in the Apology to 
demonstrate his commitment to civil disobedience as long as the agent is acting morally and is 
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willing to accept punishment.  However, Luban provides no convincing evidence from the text of 
the Apology to warrant such a claim.  A.D. Woozley, in his book Law and Obedience further 
demonstrates that an interpretation of Socrates as a supporter of civil disobedience is common.  
Woozley argues that a civil disobedient could legitimately claim to have Socrates as an ancestor, 
who would support his or her actions, such as opposing the Vietnam War or breaking other laws 
during the civil rights era.11  When I present my argument later with a closer analysis of the 
Apology, I will demonstrate that Luban’s, Woozley’s, and other common interpretations of 
Socrates’ opinion are inaccurate.  On face, however, the explanation provided by Luban poses a 
contradiction between the Apology and the Crito.
Proposed Resolutions to the Contradiction
The contradiction between the Apology and the Crito has resulted in many disputes 
regarding what Socrates “actually” believed.  Is Socrates a supporter of civil disobedience, as the 
Apology seems to suggest, or is he a supporter of strict obedience to the Laws, as his extensive 
arguments in the Crito demonstrate?  A. D. Woozley offers a clear description of the 
contradiction.  “The objection is that, as in the Apology he expresses his determination to defy a 
court order prohibiting him from engaging in further public philosophizing, and as in the Crito he 
declares that the individual must obey the court, no matter what.  At least one of the accounts 
cannot be accurately reporting Socrates.”12  Despite the contradiction, many people who engage 
in civil disobedience, such as Martin Luther King Jr., assert that Socrates was a supporter of their 
actions.  There is no obvious explanation for why they hold the arguments in the Apology above 
those in the Crito, but their insistence on assigning the belief of disobedience to Socrates has 
resulted in several attempted resolutions to the contradiction.
Most of the literature discussing the contradiction between the Apology and the Crito
focuses on resolving it in a way that forces Socrates to support civil disobedience.  Arguments 
supported by Woozley, such as the “persuade or obey” argument, and responses to that argument, 
all take different approaches to resolving the contradiction by placing Socrates in a positive light.  
Some discussions of the Crito, such as Ann Congleton’s, grasp so desperately at an explanation 
that they argue that Socrates didn’t mean anything he stated in the Crito because he was 
“dumbing-down” his arguments for Crito’s sake, claiming Crito is not intelligent enough to 
understand Socrates’ “real” position on civil (dis)obedience.  In both cases, I will demonstrate 
that these answers are inadequate to resolve the contradiction presented by the two dialogues.
Those trying to find a reconciliation of the dialogues often offer the “persuade or obey” 
argument.  The argument tries to show that Socrates actually believes, when considering both the 
Apology and the Crito, that there is not an absolute duty to obey the laws of the state, but rather 
that a person must obey the laws or try to persuade the government to change them, thereby 
engaging in civil disobedience.  Proponents of this “resolution” try to show how in the Apology, 
Socrates is merely trying to persuade the court to change laws and in the Crito that he leaves 
room for disobedience.  
A.D. Woozley suggests the “persuade-or-obey” doctrine to show Socrates supports civil 
disobedience.  He states, “In Athens people either must show what is wrong with a proposed law 
before it is enacted, or, if they are unable to convince the government or body proposing the 
legislation, then they must obey it after it is enacted.”13  Woozley takes this even further by 
saying that the “persuade-or-obey” doctrine allows for citizens to challenge the government on 
the subject of a law or policy, thereby engaging in civil disobedience.  Woozley claims that 
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Socrates would support this position and that it eliminates the contradiction between the Apology
and the Crito.
Since Woozley’s book is one of the main works on this issue, there are several responses 
to his study of the dialogues.  One response comes from Richard Kraut, who argues that 
Woozley’s interpretation of the amount of civil disobedience allowed is too narrow and that 
Socrates would go farther than Woozley allows him to.  He argues that rather than focusing on 
persuasion prior to the enactment of the law, Woozley should focus on allowing challenges of 
currently existing laws, an argument which resembles Socrates’ view more accurately.  
Additionally, recognizing that Woozley does mention both the arguments for obeying the laws 
presented in the Crito, Kraut objects that although Woozley uses them as a way to allow for civil 
disobedience, neither of the arguments allows for any disobedience.  According to Kraut, the 
alternative states that “the only situation in which someone might be justified in disobeying the 
law was that in which he was engaged in trying to persuade the authorities that the law or the 
order under it was bad.”14  The main problem with this interpretation of Socrates is that policies 
of persuasion to change laws did not exist in ancient Athens.  Kraut concludes that Woozley uses 
the word “persuade” in a way that has no clear parallel in Athenian rhetoric or philosophy.  The 
solution Woozley presents to the contradiction is therefore inadequate to resolve it, leaving no 
room for allowing civil disobedience under Socrates’ philosophy.
Kraut shows how Woozley fails, but then he proceeds to offer his own solution to the 
contradiction.  His resolution rests on the argument from agreement.  He argues that Socrates 
believes that only just agreements are to be respected.  Kraut argues that this serves a double 
purpose—“it both binds the citizen to his city under certain conditions (namely when just 
agreements have been made) and frees him under other conditions.” 15   As support for his 
argument, Kraut cites 49e in the Crito by stating that it requires a just agreement for action.  
“Whatever things someone has agreed upon with another, if they are just, are to be done” (49e-
Kraut’s translation).  However, a different translation of the Crito states, “If a man makes an 
agreement—a fair agreement—with someone, should he fulfill his side of the agreement, or 
should he try to get out of it?” (49e-Griffith’s translation)  The previous passage uses the word 
“fair” rather than “just,” giving the phrase an entirely different meaning.  “Fair” does not imply 
justice or morality, but rather a reciprocity agreement, which creates a fair tradeoff.  Combining 
the two translations suggests that by “just” Socrates means fair in accordance with reciprocity 
rather than “just” on a morality level.  Kraut’s conclusion is unwarranted because he misinterprets 
what Socrates means in the quote from Crito.  Without offering further support for believing 
Socrates only supports morally just laws, Kraut’s argument is at best weak.  Therefore, neither 
Woozley nor Kraut offer a compelling resolution to the contradiction between the Apology and 
the Crito.
J. Peter Euben, in his article “Philosophy and Politics in Plato’s Crito,” offers another 
response to Woozley.  He argues that Woozley’s analysis is incomplete for three reasons.  First, 
Euben argues that Woozley’s position, operating under the assumption that Socrates would have 
been aware of the contradiction between the Crito and the Apology, that Socrates did not need to 
mention his opinions in the Apology regarding philosophy and its practice as an exception to his 
position in the Crito, is unpersuasive.  Secondly, Euben points out that Woozley assumes that 
Socrates is honest and straightforward in the Crito.  This, Euben argues, cannot be proven to be 
true and therefore, Woozley’s reliance on the two dialogues is illegitimate.  Finally, Euben rejects 
Woozley’s analysis as an attempt to reconcile the dialogues because of Woozley’s lack of 
acknowledgement of the argument that not following the law can be socially destructive.16
Eueben’s analysis demonstrates that Woozley’s attempt at reconciliation fails to account for 
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several factors including Socrates’ knowledge of the possible contradiction, Socrates’ potential 
used of irony and myth, and Socrates’ strong argument against disobeying that shows a 
consequence of destruction of the rule of law.
Woozley’s attempted resolution clearly fails according to the responses of Kraut and 
Euben.  Additionally, their attempts to reconcile the dialogues also fail.  The persuade-or-obey 
doctrine is not only unsupported by the Crito, which clearly argues for obedience to laws, as 
previously discussed, but it is also anachronistic and incomplete.
Another resolution to the contradiction, offered by Ann Congleton, in “Two Kinds of 
Lawlessness: Plato’s Crito,” suggests that in the Crito, Socrates’ position is not sincere and that is 
evident through his attempts to “dumb-down” his position to help his friend Crito understand.  
The basic premise of Ann Congelton’s article is that there are two levels of lawlessness.  Crito 
operates at the lower level of lawlessness, breaking laws without regard to their level of justice, 
whereas Socrates operates at a higher level, meaning he only breaks laws that are unjust.  
Through the dialogue, Congleton argues, Socrates tries to raise Crito a level from lower 
lawlessness to lawfulness, the necessary level in between lower and higher lawlessness.  
Congleton assumes that Crito is not smart enough to understand Socrates’ “real” position and 
therefore must listen to a false version of Socrates’ opinion.  Through her assumptions, Congleton 
wants to prove that the Crito, when used as justification for breaking up protests, is used 
incorrectly.17
In order to begin her argument that Socrates is not giving his true opinion in the Crito, 
Congelton begins by presenting her opinion as to why Crito is “corrupt” (subject to “lower 
lawlessness”).  She argues that Crito is corrupt because he bribed the guard without showing 
concern for the problematic nature of his action and because of his knowledge and familiarity 
with uses and prices of sycophants.18  Congleton states, “Plato, by various means, characterizes 
Crito as a man with a tendency to lawlessness.”19  From this, Congleton concludes Crito has no 
sense of lawfulness, and Socrates takes on the duty of educating him about it.  Her thesis in the 
article becomes, “the problem of the dialogue is not whether Socrates should go beyond the law 
to something higher, but whether Crito can get up to the notion of law from something lower.”20
Throughout the rest of the article, while mapping out the arguments in the Crito, Congleton 
presents Crito as extremely unintelligent and Socrates as a man on a mission to individuals, 
whose goal is to help Crito see the value of obeying the law.  “Socrates does not rehearse with 
Crito the arguments against tyranny because Crito does not need that, and he does not engage 
Crito in a discussion of higher lawlessness because Crito cannot yet use that.”21
Congleton’s position has two major flaws.  Firstly, Congleton’s characterization of Crito 
is unwarranted.  For the two aforementioned reasons, which Socrates directly neither responds to 
nor condemns, Congleton quickly jumps to a conclusion that Crito is lawless and unintelligent.  
Although it is true that throughout the dialogue Crito frequently expresses his lack of 
understanding of Socrates’ comments, his confusion is not necessarily an indication of his 
ineptitude, but rather it shows his unfamiliarity with the reasoning Socrates utilizes.  Nowhere in 
the dialogue is there a suggestion that Crito would not be able to understand the concept civil 
disobedience.  Conclusively, Congleton’s initial assertion, on which her attempted resolution is 
based, is inadequate to support the rest of her argument.
The second flaw of Congleton’s position is her conviction that Socrates would lie for 
Crito’s benefit.  Socrates provides us with no reason to believe he is withholding his “true 
opinion” from Crito.  Additionally, if we believe Congleton’s conclusion that Socrates actually 
adheres to the maxim of “higher lawlessness,” or disobeying the law when it is unjust, then there 
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would be no reason for Socrates to remain in jail.  Clearly, Socrates believes his conviction was 
unjust, yet he does not escape.  The logical conclusion is that Socrates stayed because his 
arguments in the Crito were sincere as were his reasons for not disobeying the orders of the court. 
I can further support this by showing that Socrates values his life, as described in his 
speech to the jury in the Apology.  “I believe that this service of mine to god is the most valuable 
asset you in this city have ever yet possessed” (30b).  Socrates clearly wants to live to continue 
philosophizing and spreading his wisdom.  There is no indication that teaching Crito a lesson is 
Socrates reason for not escaping and consequently dying.  From the two dialogues, there is no 
reason to believe Socrates is being insincere in the Crito in order to help Crito learn about 
“lawfulness.”  Congleton’s attempt to reconcile the dialogues and advance the image of Socrates 
as a supporter of civil disobedience fails, just like Woozley’s.
The problem both Woozley and Congleton encounter in their attempt to reconcile the 
dialogues stems from their focus on changing the common interpretation of the Crito to meet 
their political agenda of advancing Socrates as an ancestor to people who engaged in civil 
disobedience in the 1960s.  A better way to reconcile the dialogues is by focusing on the Apology.  
Through in-depth analysis of the Apology, it becomes evident that Socrates at no point advocates 
civil disobedience, but rather encourages the court to follow the Laws of Athens.  The two major 
contradictions in the Apology are the disobedience of the order of the Thirty Tyrants and 
Socrates’ statement to the court that he would not obey the jury if they instructed him to stop 
practicing philosophy.  In the context of ancient Athens, neither of these “contradictions” are 
manifestations of civil disobedience.
In the Crito, Socrates makes it clear that his agreement is with Athenian Laws, not with 
the government or the court.  In the Apology, when Socrates talks about him ignoring an order of 
the Thirty Tyrants, Socrates would argue that he kept his agreement with Athenian law, while the 
tyrants violated it.  As A. D. Woozley points out, “While the initial appointment of the Thirty to 
the government of Athens following final defeat in the war had been legal enough, their 
administration became more and more arbitrary and tyrannical…It would have been impossible 
for Socrates to believe that in disobeying their order to bring in a man for summary execution he 
was disobeying the law.”22  In the context of Athenian history, knowing that the bloody reign of 
terror by the Thirty was so universally condemned, it is clear that his opposition to their order was 
not an action contrary to law, but rather a message that despite arbitrary orders, one must always 
obey the law.
The second major apparent contradiction is Socrates’ refusal to accept the court’s 
punishment if they had ordered him to stop practicing philosophy.  This is frequently used as 
justification for civil disobedience, showing that when an order by the state is unjust, that it can 
be disobeyed.  However, when we once again examine this from the context of Plato’s Athens, it 
is clear by arguing that he would not accept such a punishment, Socrates was preaching for 
adherence to the Laws, not the other way around.  As Richard Kraut contends, the court would 
have no legal authority to issue such an order; a defendant, found innocent, could not be 
penalized by the court that acquits him.23  If the court acquitted Socrates on the condition that he 
would stop practicing philosophy, the condition would be a suggestion and would have no 
binding force on Socrates.  Harry Prosch writes in his article, “Toward an Ethics of Civil 
Disobedience,”
It is not clear, however, that the court before which Socrates was tried even could—
legally—make such a conditional offer of acquittal—or of a quasi-suspended sentence.  
Its powers seemed to be limited to finding the accused innocent or guilty and, if guilty, to 
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assigning either the punishment proposed by the accuser or else that offered as an 
alternative by the condemned.24
Prosch’s analysis suggests that the court would not have the authority to order Socrates to 
stop practicing philosophy as a punishment mainly because the accuser had already suggested the 
punishment of death, the only punishment that would be acceptable if Socrates was found to be 
guilty except an alternative that he could propose.  Therefore, what Socrates is really saying is 
that he would never propose such an alternative; he would rather be put to death.  
Kraut concludes, “Socrates is therefore saying very little when he tells the court, ‘I will 
obey the god rather than you.’  He does not explicitly say in this passage how he would react to a 
valid court order banning philosophy.”25  Kraut’s analysis of Athenian law, with which both 
Woozley 26  and Prosch agree, demonstrates that Socrates’ statement does not advocate civil 
disobedience, and therefore does not create an inconsistency with the Crito.
Furthermore, several passages in the Apology advocate obeying Athenian Laws.  Under a 
lawful government, for example, Socrates demonstrates that despite a risk of death, he obeyed 
their lawful orders.  “When the commanders whom you chose to command me told me to take up 
position at Potidea and Amphipolis and Delium, on those occasions I stayed where they posted 
me, just like anyone else, and risked death” (28e).  Moreover, Socrates encourages the jury to act 
in accordance with the Laws when he tells them that he will not beg them or bribe them, but 
rather he hopes that the jury will look at his argument and make a decision based on Athenian 
Laws.  Together, these two examples in the Apology show that Socrates was committed to 
obeying Athenian Laws throughout both dialogues and was never an advocate of civil 
disobedience.
From the arguments I presented above, it is clear that Martin Luther King’s allusion to 
Socrates in his letter from Birmingham jail as a proponent of civil disobedience is an incorrect 
characterization of Socrates, which is unsupported by the text of the dialogues and the 
aforementioned arguments demonstrating his commitment to following Laws.  An analysis of the 
Apology demonstrates Socrates commitment to obeying the Laws and eliminates the contradiction 
between the Apology and the Crito by dispelling the common misperception that Socrates 
advocates civil disobedience in the Apology.
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